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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 3223 we have received spoofed packets from

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 3223 from which we hav received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Address
History
Spoof
Routable
33983 (ARTMOTION-AS)srb (Serbia)104Historyreceived
33182 (DIMENOC)usa (United States)99562Historyreceived
197706 (KemiNet)alb (Albania)40Historyblocked
37094 (CELLCOM)lbr (Liberia)50Historyblocked
52423cri (Costa Rica)190Historyblocked
62217 (VooServers)usa (United States)350Historyblocked
43940 (MTEL-AS)mne (Montenegro)587Historyblocked
25454 (ASN-OMD-FNO)mda (Moldova, Republic of)7438Historyblocked
18978 (ENZUINC-US)usa (United States)11214Historyblocked
3 (MIT-GATEWAYS)usa (United States)14911Historyblocked
36352 (AS-COLOCROSSING)usa (United States)50312Historyblocked
31042 (SERBIA-BROADBAND-AS)srb (Serbia)56299Historyblocked
8717 (SPECTRUMNET)bgr (Bulgaria)562184Historyblocked
8100 (ASN-QUADRANET-GLOBAL)usa (United States)3956603Historyblocked
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