Spoofing Information for AS 6327 (SHAW)
Spoofing status per IP block for last year of data
(Results for all dates also available.)| Spoof status key | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| received | Spoofed packet was received. | ✔ | Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it. | |
| rewritten | Spoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route. | |||
| blocked | Spoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was. | |||
| unknown | Neither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received. | |||
| IP block | Latest test | Spoof Private | Spoof Routable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24.71.156.x/24 | 2023-07-10 16:44:53 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 50.70.196.x/24 | 2023-09-08 00:27:22 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 50.71.144.x/24 | 2023-07-20 19:14:49 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 68.144.60.x/24 | 2023-08-06 22:13:49 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 70.73.152.x/24 | 2024-04-10 01:33:24 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 70.74.193.x/24 | 2023-09-29 02:19:48 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 74.3.131.x/24 | 2024-02-09 01:47:02 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 174.2.255.x/24 | 2023-10-16 21:15:19 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 184.64.101.x/24 | 2024-04-23 16:15:37 GMT | rewritten | rewritten | ||
| 184.65.160.x/24 | 2023-09-15 00:25:23 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 184.71.94.x/24 | 2023-08-19 21:18:40 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 208.118.113.x/24 | 2023-08-18 16:13:08 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 2604:3d08:65xx::/40 | 2023-09-15 00:25:23 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 2604:3d09:9xx::/40 | 2024-04-10 01:33:24 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 2604:3d09:14xx::/40 | 2024-04-23 16:15:37 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 2604:3d09:18xx::/40 | 2023-07-30 07:27:04 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
Customers of AS 6327 we have spoofer tests from
This is the list of directly connected customers of AS 6327 from which we have received a spoofer test, ordered by the customer's ability to send spoofed packets and the number of prefixes of an inferred ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in the latest month of public BGP data. BCP-84 describes ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.
| ASN | Country | Number of Prefixes in Customer Cone | Number of ASes in Customer Cone | Recent tests | Spoof Routable | 21804 (ACCESS-SK) | can (Canada) | 26 | 3 | AS 21804 tests | received | 3359 (U-ALBERTA) | can (Canada) | 565 | 11 | AS 3359 tests | blocked |
|---|
Address Space Announcement History
The customer cone for 6327 is too large for a prefix list to be useful.