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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 8359 we have received spoofed packets from

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 8359 from which we have received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Address
History
Spoof
Routable
201094 (gmhost)ukr (Ukraine)70Historyreceived
48683 (BI-LINK-AS)ukr (Ukraine)30Historyblocked
37094 (CELLCOM)lbr (Liberia)50Historyblocked
28738 (INTERLAN-AS)rus (Russian Federation)73Historyblocked
197726 (UKRNAMES-AS)ukr (Ukraine)141Historyblocked
198203 (ASN-ROUTELABEL)nld (Netherlands)141Historyblocked
48666 (AS-MAROSNET)rus (Russian Federation)271Historyblocked
199524 (WGi)lux (Luxembourg)482Historyblocked
44600 (GT-AS)ukr (Ukraine)4931Historyblocked
49505 (SELECTEL)rus (Russian Federation)7513Historyblocked
49505 (SELECTEL)rus (Russian Federation)7513Historyblocked
3 (MIT-GATEWAYS)usa (United States)24725Historyblocked
49544 (INTERACTIVE3D)nld (Netherlands)33134Historyblocked
33182 (DIMENOC)usa (United States)75039Historyblocked
20473 (AS-CHOOPA)usa (United States)2373205Historyblocked
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