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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 5580 we have received spoofed packets from

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 5580 from which we hav received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Address
History
Spoof
Routable
49009 (FFHH)deu (Germany)114Historyreceived
27589 (MOJOHOST)usa (United States)170Historyreceived
33182 (DIMENOC)usa (United States)99562Historyreceived
199664 (NLNETLABS)nld (Netherlands)20Historyblocked
1403 (EBOX)can (Canada)110Historyblocked
62217 (VooServers)usa (United States)350Historyblocked
24961 (MYLOC-AS)deu (Germany)8912Historyblocked
5645 (TEKSAVVY)can (Canada)13115Historyblocked
3 (MIT-GATEWAYS)usa (United States)14911Historyblocked
36352 (AS-COLOCROSSING)usa (United States)50312Historyblocked
8151mex (Mexico)206982Historyblocked
4739 (INTERNODE-AS)aus (Australia)3605296Historyblocked
812 (ROGERS-CABLE)can (Canada)438506868Historyblocked
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