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Spoofing Information for AS 8167

Spoofing status per IP block for last year of data

(Results for all dates also available.)
Spoof status key
receivedSpoofed packet was received.Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it.
rewrittenSpoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route.
blockedSpoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was.
unknownNeither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received.
IP blockLatest testSpoof
Private
Spoof
Routable
177.0.250.x/242026-05-17 23:22:41 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.5.214.x/242026-01-20 02:11:36 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.7.66.x/242026-02-22 13:03:06 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.201.55.x/242025-10-12 00:47:53 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.201.160.x/242025-11-15 14:21:38 GMTblockedblocked
177.202.14.x/242026-04-03 14:46:02 GMTblockedblocked
177.202.179.x/242025-09-15 18:26:21 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.203.140.x/242026-01-02 03:08:08 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.203.209.x/242025-09-11 23:27:19 GMTrewrittenrewritten
177.203.220.x/242025-07-24 23:15:14 GMTrewrittenrewritten
179.252.29.x/242025-10-17 22:42:06 GMTrewrittenrewritten
189.73.255.x/242025-07-11 23:52:10 GMTblockedblocked
191.219.244.x/242026-04-03 19:25:48 GMTblockedblocked
191.220.142.x/242025-09-18 23:32:41 GMTrewrittenrewritten
200.138.95.x/242025-10-29 17:38:13 GMTreceivedrewritten
201.89.27.x/242026-01-30 04:03:52 GMTblockedblocked
2804:d55:49xx::/402025-09-26 11:55:25 GMTblockedblocked
2804:d55:76xx::/402026-01-30 04:03:52 GMTblockedblocked
2804:d59:8axx::/402025-07-24 23:15:14 GMTblockedblocked
2804:d59:91xx::/402025-10-17 22:42:06 GMTblockedblocked
2804:d59:94xx::/402026-04-03 18:24:22 GMTblockedblocked

Customers of AS 8167 we have spoofer tests from

This is the list of directly connected customers of AS 8167 from which we have received a spoofer test, ordered by the customer's ability to send spoofed packets and the number of prefixes of an inferred ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in the latest month of public BGP data. BCP-84 describes ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Recent
tests
Spoof
Routable
273793bra (Brazil)31AS 273793 testsreceived
52564bra (Brazil)3210AS 52564 testsreceived
14840bra (Brazil)109001564AS 14840 testsreceived
53112bra (Brazil)91AS 53112 testsblocked
52771bra (Brazil)289AS 52771 testsblocked
26599bra (Brazil)2211AS 26599 testsblocked
52573bra (Brazil)690238AS 52573 testsblocked
262907bra (Brazil)1155185AS 262907 testsblocked

Address Space Announcement History

The customer cone for 8167 is too large for a prefix list to be useful.

Last Modified