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Spoofing Information for AS 52468

Spoofing status per IP block

Spoof status key
receivedSpoofed packet was received.Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it.
rewrittenSpoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route.
blockedSpoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was.
unknownNeither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received.
IP blockLatest testSpoof
Private
Spoof
Routable
170.83.243.x/242020-04-20 15:04:07 GMTrewrittenreceived
186.148.97.x/242021-11-16 21:38:21 GMTblockedblocked
186.148.106.x/242021-12-30 16:20:05 GMTblockedblocked
186.179.70.x/242017-12-11 03:32:32 GMTrewrittenrewritten
186.179.71.x/242021-08-25 14:14:47 GMTrewrittenrewritten
190.61.87.x/242022-08-01 02:51:15 GMTblockedblocked
190.61.127.x/242021-12-30 16:32:45 GMTblockedblocked
200.229.147.x/242022-09-17 04:43:46 GMTunknownreceived

Customers of AS 52468 we have spoofer tests from

This is the list of directly connected customers of AS 52468 from which we have received a spoofer test, ordered by the customer's ability to send spoofed packets and the number of prefixes of an inferred ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Recent
tests
Spoof
Routable
269940hnd (Honduras)10AS 269940 testsreceived
262146hnd (Honduras)20AS 262146 testsblocked

Address Space Announcement History

The customer cone for 52468 is too large for a prefix list to be useful.

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