Spoof status key | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
received | Spoofed packet was received. | ✔ | Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it. | |
rewritten | Spoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route. | |||
blocked | Spoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was. | |||
unknown | Neither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received. |
IP block | Latest test | Spoof Private | Spoof Routable | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
170.80.152.x/24 | 2024-11-07 13:35:03 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
186.227.0.x/24 | 2024-10-08 03:03:32 GMT | blocked | received | ||
186.227.2.x/24 | 2024-11-07 13:53:54 GMT | blocked | received | ||
186.227.13.x/24 | 2024-11-07 13:41:38 GMT | rewritten | received | ||
186.227.14.x/24 | 2024-10-16 16:39:49 GMT | rewritten | ✔ | received | |
2804:1dfc:30xx::/40 | 2024-09-09 16:03:43 GMT | received | received |
This is the list of directly connected customers of AS 262765 from which we have received a spoofer test, ordered by the customer's ability to send spoofed packets and the number of prefixes of an inferred ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in the latest month of public BGP data. BCP-84 describes ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.
ASN | Country | Number of Prefixes in Customer Cone | Number of ASes in Customer Cone | Recent tests | Spoof Routable | 262797 | bra (Brazil) | 4 | 0 | AS 262797 tests | blocked |
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This is the address space announcement history of an AS and its customer cone, derived from prefix announcements for the AS recorded in public BGP data. For each month, we have aggregated more specific prefix announcements into contiguous address blocks, where possible. The goal of this page is to allow a network operator to judge the feasibility of deploying a static ingress access control list for their border router connecting to the AS. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low."
Year |2022 2023 2024
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
131.221.56.0/22 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
138.121.252.0/22 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
168.232.72.0/22 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
170.80.152.0/22 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
186.227.0.0/20 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
2804:1dfc::/32 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Year |2022 2023 2024
Year |2022 2023 2024
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
177.85.236.0/23 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Year |2022 2023 2024
Year |2022 2023 2024
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
131.72.92.0/22 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
179.97.64.0/21 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
186.237.0.0/20 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
2804:23c::/32 | ————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Year |2022 2023 2024
Year |2022 2023 2024
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
186.251.188.0/23 |————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+——‒+
Month |Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
Year |2022 2023 2024