Spoofing Information for AS 13436 (INTERNET2-CONF)
Spoofing status per IP block for last year of data
(Results for all dates also available.)| Spoof status key | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| received | Spoofed packet was received. | ✔ | Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it. | |
| rewritten | Spoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route. | |||
| blocked | Spoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was. | |||
| unknown | Neither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received. | |||
| IP block | Latest test | Spoof Private | Spoof Routable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 163.253.49.x/24 | 2023-09-20 14:21:19 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
| 2001:468:26xx::/40 | 2023-09-20 14:21:19 GMT | blocked | blocked | ||
Address Space Announcement History
This is the address space announcement history of an AS and its customer cone, derived from prefix announcements for the AS recorded in public BGP data. For each month, we have aggregated more specific prefix announcements into contiguous address blocks, where possible. The goal of this page is to allow a network operator to judge the feasibility of deploying a static ingress access control list for their border router connecting to the AS. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low."
Address Space Announcements: 13436 (INTERNET2-CONF)
No prefix history data was found for ASN 13436