Spoofing Information for AS 12389 (ROSTELECOM-AS)

Spoofing status per IP block for last year of data

(Results for all dates also available.)
Spoof status key
receivedSpoofed packet was received.Pattern of tests from this IP block indicates a switch from allowing spoofing to blocking it.
rewrittenSpoofed packet was received, but the source address was changed en route.
blockedSpoofed packet was not received, but unspoofed packet was.
unknownNeither spoofed nor unspoofed packet was received.
IP blockLatest testSpoof
5.137.102.x/242023-02-22 02:52:06 GMTblockedblocked
178.67.9.x/242022-12-19 17:20:49 GMTrewrittenblocked

Customers of AS 12389 we have spoofer tests from

This is the list of directly connected customers of AS 12389 from which we have received a spoofer test, ordered by the customer's ability to send spoofed packets and the number of prefixes of an inferred ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in the latest month of public BGP data. BCP-84 describes ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
60068 (CDN77)nld (Netherlands)17095848AS 60068 testsblocked
21859 (ZEN-ECN)idn (Indonesia)196392019AS 21859 testsblocked
13335 (CLOUDFLARENET)bra (Brazil)315352505AS 13335 testsblocked
8359 (MTS)rus (Russian Federation)347364353AS 8359 testsblocked

Address Space Announcement History

The customer cone for 12389 is too large for a prefix list to be useful.

Last Modified