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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 8400 we have received spoofed packets from

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 8400 from which we hav received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Address
History
Spoof
Routable
3 (MIT-GATEWAYS)usa (United States)8115Historyblocked
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