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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 6453 That Have Sent Spoofed Packets

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 6453 from which we hav received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of
Prefixes
Address
History
37449 (ONLIME-SL)sle (Sierra Leone)2History
45839 (PIRADIUS-AS)mys (Malaysia)20History
25467 (AKTON-AS)mkd (Macedonia)21History
9116 (GOLDENLINES-ASN)isr (Israel)28History
32613 (IWEB-AS)can (Canada)30History
8551 (BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS)isr (Israel)48History
12880 (DCI-AS)irn (Iran)67History
9318 (HANARO-AS)kor (South Korea)100History
45899 (VNPT-AS-VN)vnm (Vietnam)136History
812 (ROGERS-CABLE)can (Canada)170History
7922 (COMCAST-7922)usa (United States)177History
11427 (SCRR-11427)usa (United States)196History
7545 (TPG-INTERNET-AP)aus (Australia)258History
3786 (LGDACOM)kor (South Korea)355History
7029 (WINDSTREAM)usa (United States)369History
5650 (FRONTIER-FRTR)usa (United States)497History
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