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Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
Customers of 4436 we have received spoofed packets from

This page lists the directly connected customers of AS 4436 from which we hav received a spoofed packet from, ordered by the number of prefixes of an inferred Ingress ACL derived from prefix announcements for the customer recorded in public BGP data. BCP-84 describes Ingress ACLs as "the most bulletproof solution when done properly" and the "best fit ... when the configuration is not too dynamic, ... if the number of used prefixes is low." Further detail about the size and dynamism of an inferred ACL is available by following the History link for each AS.

ASNCountryNumber of Prefixes
in Customer Cone
Number of ASes
in Customer Cone
Address
History
Spoof
Routable
45839 (PIRADIUS-AS)mys (Malaysia)200Historyreceived
8893 (ARTFILES-AS)deu (Germany)267Historyreceived
9794 (DNET-ID-AP)idn (Indonesia)160Historyblocked
11878 (TZULO)usa (United States)210Historyblocked
3737 (PTD-AS)usa (United States)10533Historyblocked
46844 (ST-BGP)usa (United States)20212Historyblocked
63008 (CONTINA)usa (United States)2319Historyblocked
38001 (NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP)kor (South Korea)30845Historyblocked
46562 (TOTAL-SERVER-SOLUTIONS)usa (United States)35912Historyblocked
53889 (MICFO)usa (United States)45610Historyblocked
852 (ASN852)can (Canada)1589209Historyblocked
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